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JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHTS
PENNSYLVANIA PROPERTY CASES OF 1962
BY WILLIAM H. DODD*
CONVEYANCES

Deeds
In Heidt v. Aughenbaugh Coal Co.,1 the deed in question excepted and
reserved in the grantor "all of the fire clay together with the mining rights
and privileges." The right to mine the fire clay had previously been leased
to the defendants. The grantee under the deed brought an action to enjoin
the mineral lessee from strip mining for the fire clay, arguing that, since
this process was unknown at the time of the lease, and since the agricultural
use of the land was hindered by strip mining, only deep mining had been
contemplated by the parties to the lease. Because the lease gave the lessee
"the right to strip the surface," and to use all practical methods "now in use,
or which may hereafter be used" in mining the fire clay, the court held that
this language allowed the defendant to strip mine.
Two recent cases involved claims of fraud in the procurement of a deed.
In Roe v. Roe, 2 the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment against her
mother-in-law, claiming title to the land through a recorded deed allegedly
executed by the mother-in-law. The lower court directed a verdict for the
plaintiff, and the supreme court affirmed, pointing to the failure of the defendant to produce any convincing evidence of fraud or forgery, after she
had admitted that her signature was on the deed. The court said: "The
introduction of the executed and delivered deed, complete on its face, shifted
to appellant the burden of proving the deed the result of fraud, accident or
mistake." 3
In Shydlinski v. Vogt,4 the plaintiff claimed that his daughter, the defendant, had procured certain conveyances of real estate from him by
coercion and undue influence. The original deeds to the daughter reserved
* Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; A.B., 1936, Dickinson College;
LL.B., 1938, Dickinson School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge and to express
his gratitude for the research assistance of the following students of the Dickinson School
of Law: John M. Fisher, Marx S. Leopold, and Robert F. Pappano.
1. 406 Pa. 188, 176 A.2d 400 (1962).
2. 407 Pa. 125, 178 A.2d 714 (1962).

3. Id. at 127, 178 A.2d at 715.
4. 406 Pa. 534, 179 A.2d 240 (1962).
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a life estate in the grantor and contained a covenant whereby the grantee
promised to care for the grantor for his life. Shortly thereafter, the grantor
executed a power of attorney in favor of his daughter, and then released to
her all his rights under the previous deed. The plaintiff contended that a
confidential relationship existed between him and the grantee by reason of
the power of attorney, and that the relationship placed upon the grantee the
burden of proving that the release was a valid and fair transaction. The
supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by the lower court,
holding that the daughter sustained her burden by showing that she had
cared for her ailing father for three years at great personal sacrifice, motivating him to reward her by these gifts. The court also noted that the
grantor had an attorney draw up and explain the conveyances for him, was
in good health at the time of the conveyances, and had made other gifts to
his children.
Fiore v. Fiore5 involved the effectiveness of a lost and unrecorded deed.
In 1940, the grantor had executed and acknowledged a deed conveying certain
land to his wife, and had placed the instrument in the hands of his attorney.
Two years later the grantor died intestate survived by his wife and four
children. In 1957, the deed, which had been lost, was discovered and recorded.
Plaintiff, the grantor's son, brought this action in equity to obtain judicial
nullification of the instrument. The court recognized the deed as valid even
though it had not been recorded, but added that delivery to a third person
must be accompanied by "an express and definite instruction that the deed
is to be given to the grantee then or at some future time" 6 in order to
pass title effectively. The lack of an) such instruction here, plus the fact
that the grantor continued in control of the property until his death, without
disclosing the existence of the deed to any members of his family, overcame
the presumption of delivery arising from the execution of the deed, and
led the court to rule in favor of its cancellation.
Covenants
The case of Kajowski v. Null, 7 involved the enforcement of a restrictive
covenant which was common to all the deeds in a particular neighborhood.
The restriction in dispute disallowed the use or erection of a machine shop
by the property owner. When the defendants purchased the restricted land,
it contained an old, ramshackle building which they then used as a part-time
machine shop for a period of ten years. In 1954, the defendants commenced
the construction of a much larger machine shop, despite repeated warnings
5. 405 Pa. 303, 174 A.2d 858 (1961).
6. Id. at 306, 174 A.2d at 860.
7. 405 Pa. 589, 177 A.2d 101 (1962).
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from the plaintiff, an adjoining property owner. The plaintiff then instituted
suit to enjoin the restricted use, and the lower court granted the injunction,
disallowing any further operation of the machine shop and ordering the
defendants to tear down the building. The supreme court affirmed the grant
of the injunction, noting the added annoyance due to the increased use of the
machine shop, but reversed the order to demolish the building, stating that
such would be unjust because the building could be devoted to uses consistent
with the restrictive covenant.
8
In Pastore v. Lake Shore Maintenance Ass'n, the defendant association

was responsible for the enforcement of certain restrictions contained in a
realty subdivision plan. One of these restrictions provided that no residence
could be erected until the plans for the construction had been approved by
the association in light of its purpose to enforce the restrictions on this residential district. Pursuant to this covenant, the plaintiff was denied permission
to construct a house with 1616 square feet of living area, because of a requirement that all houses of that type contain not less than 1700 square feet
of living area. The association had adopted this requirement subsequent
to the plaintiff's purchase of his lot. In declaratory judgment proceedings
the plaintiff sought to have the requirement declared void, as being arbitrary
and unreasonable. The court held that, because of the high class nature of
the residential district, the minimum living area requirement was reasonable
in that it was designed to protect the value of the residences already built.
The court also pointed out that because the plaintiff had previously built
within this subdivision he was aware of the fact that the square foot requirement of living area had been changed by the association from time to time.
The covenantee, in Plymouth Woods Corp. v. Maxwell,9 attempted to
enjoin the covenantor from displaying a "For Sale" sign on his property,
because a provision in the contract of sale between the parties forbade the
buyer from placing "any sign, fence, or other structure upon the premises
without first obtaining the written consent" 10 of the covenantee or seller. The
deed conveying the property did not contain this provision but the court
decided that "this omission would not cancel out the restriction since the
Agreement specifically stated that the pertinent provision would survive the
settlement."1 " However, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, stating that the covenantor's inability to display
such a sign on his land would work real hardship with little benefit, if any,
to the covenantee. Two justices dissented on the basis that the complaint
8.
9.
10.
11.

197 Pa. Super. 419, 178 A.2d 776 (1962).
407 Pa. 539, 181 A.2d 321 (1962).
Id. at 540, 181 A.2d at 322.
Ibid.
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should not be dismissed on the above grounds, without a hearing on the facts.
The agreement of sale involved in McWilliams v. Luria12 required the
buyer to improve the real estate by erecting thereon "an office building" the
final plans for which were to be approved by the seller. After complying
with this requirement, the buyer started to erect another office building on
the premises. The seller brought this action to enjoin the construction of the
second building, contending that the word "an" in the agreement limited
the defendant to one office building. The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that after the first building was completed the provision in the
agreement was complied with and was no longer of any effect. The court
added that the requirement was not a promise to build only one office
building and that no ambiguity existed which could justify a consideration of
parol evidence. The dissenting opinion stated that the word "an" in the
requirement clearly allowed only one office building to be constructed, and
parol evidence was unnecessary to show that the word "an" was intended to
mean only "one."
Easements
1
In Baptist Church v. Urquhart,
3 the defendants conveyed to a church
two tracts of land which were separated by a wedge-shaped tract already
owned by the church. The grantors reserved a strip of land at the edge of
these two tracts as a right of way. Since the tracts conveyed had no common
boundary line, the strip reserved was not continuous, but was interrupted by the
very tip of the wedge-shaped tract which the church already owned.
Twenty-three years elapsed before the defendants asserted the right of way,
and in this time the church had built on one of the tracts a parsonage, the
corner of which extended about two inches over the right of way. In this
action the church sought to enjoin the defendants from constructing a roadway
along the right of way. The lower court granted the relief requested, holding
that the grantors never had a right to use the land originally owned by the
church, which separated the two tracts involved, and because the right of way
was therefore interrupted and unattainable, the whole right failed. The court
added that the right of way over the tract containing the parsonage was also
extinguished by estoppel.
On appeal the supreme court agreed that "the defendants could not
Creserve' an easement across lands they did not own" ;14 thus the right of way
across the two tracts was interrupted by the church-owned land. But the
court did not think the purpose of the easement was unattainable, so that

12. 407 Pa. 632, 182 A.2d 748 (1962).
13. 406 Pa. 620, 178 A.2d 583 (1962).

14. Id. at 625, 178 A.2d at 586.
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the easement should be completely defeated. The court pointed out that the
defendants could acquire a license to use a portion of an adjoining tract owned
by the Philadelphia Electric Company. With this license, the proposed
roadway would avoid the intervening wedge of land owned by the church,
and still make use of the right of way existing in the two tracts. 15
The lower court's statement that the defendants' easement was extinguished by estoppel was also disapproved. The supreme court agreed that
the encroachment by the parsonage was a use inconsistent with the right
of way, that its removal to restore the right of way would work an unreasonable hardship upon the church, but added that "if the appellants were estopped
altogether from using their easement . . . it would be an inequitable result,

because they gave a substantial amount of land to the appellee as an outright
gift, clearly reserving a thirty foot right of way."16 The court decided that
by limiting the defendants' right of way to a single lane ten feet wide on the
side farthest removed from the parsonage and by requiring adequate fencing
to keep children from straying onto the roadway, "the unreasonable harm to
7
the plaintiff would cease to exist."'
The plaintiff in Borens v. Krywoshyja' sought to enjoin the defendant,
an adjoining landowner, from denying him any access to an alleyway which
was located on the defendant's property. The plaintiff had been using the
alley since 1936 and the deeds of both parties contained provisions allowing
each the free use of the alleyway between them. The court decided that since
the plaintiff could not trace the provision in the deeds to a common owner
he could not establish an easement by grant. However, the court held that
the plaintiff's use of the alley for more than twenty-one years appeared to be
adverse and this evidence entitled him to a prescriptive use. In answer to
the defendant's contention that the plaintiff must show that the use was not
permissive, the court said: "The owner of the land has the burden of proving
that the use of the easement was under some license

. . .

inconsistent with

the right claimed by the other party."' 9
15. In reaching this conclusion the court had to distinguish Trexler v. Lutz, 180
Pa. Super. 24, 118 A.2d 210 (1955), which the lower court relied upon in holding that
the right of way fell as a whole. The supreme court said: "In Trexler, the right of
way came to a dead end and could not possibly serve any useful purpose. Such is not
the fact here. If the appellants can secure a license to use a small portion of the electric
company's land, then the right of way will serve a useful purpose." 406 Pa. at 627,
178 A.2d at 587.
16. 406 Pa. at 628, 178 A.2d at 588.
17. Ibid. The supreme court evidently approved of the lower court's citation to
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 505 (1944), for the requirements needed to extinguish an
easement by estoppel, but merely decided that the third requirement was not met, i.e.,
that "the restoration of the privilege of use authorized by the easement would cause
unreasonable harm to the owner of the servient tenement." 406 Pa. at 627-28, 178 A.2d

at 587.
18.

199 Pa. Super. 250, 184 A.2d 378 (1962).

19. Id. at 254, 184 A.2d at 381.
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Vendor-Purchaser
In Elfant v. Clauss,20 the purchaser of a lot and house brought an action
in equity to rescind the contract and recover the down payment because of
a discrepancy in the description of the lot. The purchaser had refused to
make settlement on the date specified because of this discrepancy and he had
so advised the seller. The seller then sold the lot to a third party for 1750
dollars less than the original contract price. The original agreement of sale
contained a provision allowing the retention of the down payment by the
seller should the purchaser default in making final settlement. The court
stated that the issue was whether the plaintiff could rescind the contract, thus
entitling him to a return of the down payment. The lower court decided that
because the purchaser was an experienced real estate agent, and because the
actual size of the lot was properly recorded and plainly obvious from a
physical inspection, the plaintiff had no basis for claiming that he was deceived. The superior court agreed, affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint.
Volkent v. Swan21 likewise involved an action by a purchaser to recover
his down payment because of an alleged breach of the sale agreement by the
seller. The defendant claimed the down payment as liquidated damages,
pursuant to a provision in the agreement of sale, but the purchaser contended
that the seller could not furnish a marketable title "free and clear of any
encumbrances" 22 because the seller had conveyed to the Pennsylvania Power
and Light Company a right of way to erect poles and string wires on or
across the property and along the adjoining roads. In the opinion of the
lower court, the power company had been given only the right to string poles
along public roads, which the court felt was not an encumbrance under the
agreement. The superior court disagreed, stating that the language granting
the right of way seemed to allow the power company to string wire and erect
poles anywhere on the tract. In any event, concluded the court, even if the
power company's right to string poles anywhere across the property was
not clearly set forth, the fact that the power company could claim such a
right placed enough of a burden on the property to prevent the vendor
from furnishing as good a title as he had promised.
Dedication
The plaintiff in Boyer v. Baker 23 was attempting to prove public acceptance of an alleyway which had been dedicated on a recorded subdivision plan.
20.
21.
22.
23.

197 Pa. Super. 201, 177 A.2d 153 (1962).
197 Pa. Super. 576, 179 A.2d 274 (1962).
Id. at 578, 179 A.2d at 275.
196 Pa. Super. 405, 175 A.2d 143 (1961).
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In the absence of acceptance of the way within twenty-one years after the
plan had been recorded, there could be no later acceptance without the consent
of the owners of the land on which it had been laid out. 24 Since the plaintiff
was not a purchaser of one of the lots in the subdivision plan, he did not
have an easement over the way and could only use it if it were given to the
public. Although the plaintiff alleged that he and other members of the public
had been using the alleyway, that the sewer authority of the municipality
had laid a sewer under it, that the township supervisors had from time to
time repaired and improved the alleyway, and that the township board of
supervisors had refused to vacate the alley "and decided 'to leave alley in
present status,' "25 the court held these allegations insufficient to show an
acceptance of the alley as a public way. The actions of the sewer authority
were dismissed as insignificant, because the authority acted separately from
the municipality. The court said that "acceptance of such dedicated ways
must be established by some definite authoritative act of the municipality,
or by a long continued use by the public, or by a combination of municipal
acts and public uses." 20
FUTURE INTERESTS

27

In Wilford v. Dickey, the superior court construed the following
reservation in a deed effective in 1912:
Reserving to the parties of the first part, their heirs and assigns,
the right to use said premises as tenants of the party of the second
part, free of rental, until the party of the second part, his heirs or
the development of
assigns require the same in connection with
28
hydroelectric power on the Delaware River.
The issue arose in an action to quiet title following a tax sale to the plaintiff.
The defendants, successors to the grantor in the above deed, claimed that
the sale was invalid because they had not received notice of the proceedings.
The plaintiff contended that the defendants were not entitled to notice because
they were not the owners of the fee; however, the defendants argued that the
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1961 (1961).
25. 196 Pa. Super. at 407, 175 A.2d at 144.
26. Id. at 408, 175 A.2d at 144. The court felt that these elements could not be
established by the plaintiff's complaint. The use of the alley by members of the public
was not alleged to have been for a long and continuous period, and the repair of the way
by the municipality was not an unequivocal act of acceptance, in the opinion of the court.
As to the board's refusal "to vacate," the court said:
The fact that the township commission refused to . . . vacate . . . [the alley]
and left it in its present status does not indicate a present or prior acceptance.
It means only that . . . [the alley] should remain accepted or unaccepted as
the history of the alley might indicate.
196 Pa. Super. at 408, 175 A.2d at 144-45.
27. 196 Pa. Super. 468, 175 A.2d 98 (1961).
28. Id. at 469-70, 175 A.2d at 98-99.

24.
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1912 deed had reserved the land in fee simple subject to being divested when
and if the grantee required the land in connection with the development of
hydroelectric power.2 9 The superior court ruled that, although the grantor
had retained many of the legal rights incident to a fee, technical words of
leasehold had been used; thus the deed of 1912 conveyed a fee subject to
a term of indefinite duration.
Burleigh Estate"0 concerned the construction of the following clause,
which disposed of the corpus of a testamentary trust after successive life
estates in the testator's son, daughter-in-law and children of the son living
at testator's death: "equally to my said brother and sister, or their heirs, in
fee simple, absolutely and unconditionally." Both the brother and sister
predeceased the income beneficiaries. The son of testator's sister claimed
one half of the corpus, contending that the above-quoted words gave his
mother a vested interest in one half of the principal, which interest had been
devised to him. A child of the brother and a child of a deceased child of
the brother argued that the phrase, "or their heirs," provided substitutionary
gifts to the heirs of the brother and sister, should they predecease the last
income beneficiary, and that all the heirs should take per capita. The supreme
court held that the gifts were substitutionary, saying:
While several early Pennsylvania cases held that "A and his
heirs" were synonomous with "A or his heirs", our later decisions
have followed the common law and held that in the latter case, the
gift to the heirs was substitutionary unless the language of the entire
will, in light of the surrounding circumstances, indicated a different
intent .... 31
In addition, the circumstances of the ages of the brother and sister, in comparison with those of the grandchildren, on the date the will was executed,
indicated that the testator did not expect them to survive the life beneficiaries,
and that he intended "or their heirs" to be an alternative substitutionary gift.
The court then concluded that the "heirs" contemplated were the heirs
of the brother and sister ascertained at the date the last income beneficiary
died. The court did not consider that the word "equally" required the persons
so ascertained to take per capita but that the heirs of each should receive one
29. Defendants based their argument on RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 46, comment m,
illustration 19 (1943) :
A owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, transfers Blackacre "to B and
his heirs, excepting and reserving to the grantor and his heirs the north half
of Blackacre until B marries C." In the north half of Blackacre, A retains
an estate in fee simple subject to an executory limitation of the springing type.
See.Walker v. Marcellus & Otisco Lake Ry., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919),
where a similar, springing interest was held violative of the rule against perpetuities.
30. 405 Pa. 373, 175 A.2d 838 (1961). The effective date of the instrument was
1953.
31. Id. at 377, 175 A.2d at 840.
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half of the corpus to be distributed among them per capita and per stirpes.
On this basis, one half went to the son of the sister; the three heirs of the
deceased brother each received one sixth.
In Edwards Estate,3 2 the testator died in 1938 leaving a life estate to a
relative and then successive life estates to named in4ividuals, their children
and grandchildren. The corpus was to be distributed to the great grandchildren. The first life tenant died in 1959. The gift to the named persons
was valid. The gift of income to their children, because it had to vest within
the period required by the common law rule against perpetuities33 even if
they were born after the testator's death, was also valid. However, the
gifts to the grandchildren and the great grandchildren were invalid because
the named persons could have more children after the death of the testator,
and these after-born children might have children born to them twenty-one
years after the death of the lives in being at the testator's death. The sole
issue in the Edwards case was whether or not the invalid limitations were
so much a part of the testator's scheme of distribution that the intermediate
valid life estates must also fail. The court articulated the following test in
order to ascertain whether the so-called doctrine of infectious invalidity
applied:
[D]oes the general testamentary scheme under attack indicate a
plan in which the dominant intent was not to create life estates
particularly to benefit those who were to enjoy thei, but to create
such estates as incidental to and for the principal purpose of supporting remainders which might not vest till a time beyond that
allowed by the law ?4

It was held that the scheme was to tie up property far beyond the period
allowed, and that the intermediate life estates also failed.35
The supreme court in Henderson Estate36 construed the will of Adelaide
Henderson who died in 1908 survived by four children. The testatrix divided
her residuary estate into four equal parts, one of which was given to her
son, George, in fee simple. The three remaining shares were placed in trust
32. 407 Pa. 512, 180 A.2d 590 (1962).
33. The most widely accepted statement of the rule is found in GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942) : "No interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest." Note that the Edwards will became effective in 1938; therefore the court
applied the common law rule instead of Pennsylvania's statutory rule which only applies
to transfers effective on or after January 1, 1948. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301 (1950).
34. 407 Pa. at 512, 180 A.2d at 593.
35. See Fiduciary Rev., July, 1962, p. 1-2, for a discussion of this problem under
section 5 of the Estates Act of 1947. According to the editors of that publication, "this
is the first time since Scott Est., 301 Pa. 509 (1930), that the Supreme Court has
declared future interests invalid prior to termination of otherwise valid interests."
36. 405 Pa. 451, 176 A.2d 428 (1962).
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with the income to be paid to the other three children, Louisa, William and
Gertrude; the corpus was given to their children. The last income beneficiary
died in 1960, and the sole question was whether or not George's issue could
share in that part of the corpus that would have gone to William's children
had any been born. Tjhe significant provision was:
but should any of my said three children die leaving no children or
other issue, living at the time of such child's death, I direct that the
portion of the principal share of any such deceased child of mine
shall continue to constitute a part of my residuary estate for the
benefit of the remaining cestui que trustent in the trusts in this will
mentioned and in the proportion hereinabove designated . . .37
The supreme court held that George's children had no rights in William's
share of the trust, because George was not a cestui que trust. It was noted
that this construction produced an inequality among grandchildren, but the
court pointed out that the inequality began when George was given his onefourth share outright and in fee, while the remaining three quarters were
left in trust for the other three children for life, and then to their children.
In Vandergrift Estate3 8 the residue of the estate was placed in trust
with one fifth of the income to be given for life to each of the testator's five
children-Samuel, Joseph, Kate, Henrietta and Margaret; the principal was
to be paid to each child's surviving issue per stirpes. The will then provided:
If any of my said sons or daughters die either before or after my
decease without leaving any child or any issue of a deceased child
surviving him or her, then, the income from said share shall be
paid to his or her surviving brothers and sisters for and during
the natural life of each surviving brother and sister, [and] . . . the

share of the principal of the said trust funds or estates to be paid
over to the children and issue of such deceased surviving brother or
sister shall be proportionally increased . . .39
The first four children died leaving issue and distributions were made without
controversy. However, Margaret's death without issue in 1959 raised two
questions: upon the death of Margaret, did an intestacy occur, and if not,
did the class of takers include only those who survived her?
The one sequence of events not provided for by the testator had occurred
-a child died without surviving issue or surviving brothers or sisters. A
very literal reading of the will necessarily required an intestacy construction,
but the court held that, in light of the entire scheme, the "only alternative to
give effect to that which was clearly the testamentary intent is to read the
37. Id. at 453, 176 A.2d at 429.
38. 406 Pa. 14, 177 A.2d 432 (1962).
39. Id. at 21, 177 A.2d at 435. (Emphasis added.)
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word 'surviving' as 'other' and for such construction there is ample precedent."

40

Secondly, the court held that those grandchildren and great-grandchildren
who were alive at the time of the death of their respective parents or grandparents received a vested interest in the one-fifth part of the trust created
for Margaret's issue, subject to being divested if she died leaving issue. Thus
one did not have to survive any income beneficiary dying without issue in
order to take. This conclusion was particularly significant as to that share
which was acquired by the children of Joseph. Joseph died in 1915, survived
by two sons, one of whom was adjudged bankrupt in 1938 and died in 1959,
after Margaret had died. The court concluded that because his interest
had vested in 1915, it vested in the trustee in bankruptcy by operation of law
when, in 1938, he was adjudged bankrupt.
CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP

Tenancy by the Entireties
In Brandt v. Hershey,41 a wife brought replevin against her husband
and others to recover one half of a crop harvested by the defendants from
a farm owned by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. It was
held that she could not sue the other defendants without the joinder of her
husband. Since her rights arose from property held by the entireties, the
joinder of the husband, either voluntarily or involuntarily, was compulsory.
The suit against the husband was also dismissed. Replevin is primarily
a possessory action in which the issues are limited to the plaintiff's title or
right to possession. In order to maintain the action, the right to possession
must be exclusive. Citing cases which held that one tenant in common
could not use replevin to sue another tenant in common, the court ruled that
the wife's right to the land (and thus to the crops) was no greater than her
husband's. Even though legislation 42 authorizes a wife to bring replevin
against her husband to recover her separate property, she may not use that
statute to recover an undivided interest in personal property owned by the
entireties.
In dicta, the superior court noted that if the plaintiff had averred that
her husband had appropriated the crop solely to his own use, to the complete
exclusion of his wife, an accounting could be obtained in equity. However,
proof of such facts would not entitle her to a partition, because entireties
43
property may not be partitioned while the parties remain married.
40. Id. at 28, 177 A.2d at 439. Chief Justice Bell dissented on this point only.
41. 198 Pa. Super. 539, 182 A.2d 219 (1962).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1930).
43. Property held by the entireties can be partitioned by agreement. Some cases
have considered the appropriation of property by the husband for his use, to the exclu-
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Hunsberger v. Bender4 4 was a suit by a man against his former wife to
compel the sale of realty (formerly the family residence) held by the parties
as tenants by the entireties. The property was acquired in 1927 and the
couple were divorced in 1947. The defendant occupied the home until 1957,
when the complaint was filed. Between 1947 and 1957, she made several
improvements to the property, -nhancing its value. The lower court divided
the proceeds from the sale equah, without considering either the value of the
improvements or the fair rental va, of the property while the defendant was
in sole possession. The wife appeai,!' contending that the interest of each
tenant was fixed as of the time of the _:vorce; however, the supreme court
affirmed, citing the applicable statute:
The interest of each of the respective tenants by entireties shall be
conclusively deemed to be one-half of the value of the property.
The proceeds of any sale had under the provisions of this act after
payment of expenses thereof shall be equally divided between the
tenants by entireties.

45

The court relied on the second sentence of the section for its holding that
the act required an equal division as of the time of the sale and not as of the
time of the divorce. It refused to rule on whether or not the defendant
could recover the value of her improvements in a separate suit for restitution
based on unjust enrichment.
Tenancy in Common
In Beall v. Hare,46 one of the five co-tenants brought an action against
the other four co-tenants to partition land they held as tenants in common.
The trial court found the land incapable of partition and ordered it sold to
the party offering the highest bid unless a majority of interested parties
objected. Three of the defendants objected and requested that the property
be sold to them; the fourth defendant also objected and moved that the land
be awarded to all four defendants. Although the first three objected to this
solution, it was accepted by the lower court. The supreme court affirmed,
citing Rule 1563(b) 47 and concluding:
sion of the wife, as an offer of partition, with the wife accepting by bringing an action
of partition. See Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 At. 172 (1934).
44. 407 Pa. 185, 180 A.2d 4 (1962).
45. Id. at 186-87, 180 A.2d at 5. The court was citing from Pa. Laws 1925, act
350, § 3, at 649. This statute has come under considerable attack; two lower court cases
held it to be unconstitutional in part: Clements v. Kandler, 9 Pa. D. & C. 310 (C.P.
1927) ; Ebersole v. Goodman, 7 Pa. D. & C. 605 (C.P. 1925). In 1927, the act was repealed and replaced by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 501-04 (1931). However, the supreme
court in Christner v. Christner, 366 Pa. 41, 76 A.2d 361 (1950), held that the 1925 act is
still applicable to tenancies by the entireties created after the 1925 act but before the 1927
act. Section 3 of the 1925 act, which was cited by the Hunsberger court, is similar to
the corresponding section of the 1927 act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 503 (1931).
46. 405 Pa. 288, 174 A.2d 847 (1961).
47. PA. R. Civ. P. 1563(b) provides:
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It makes no difference how many defendants object to the sale and
wish to retain their undivided interests, so long as they own a
majority in interest. Nor does it make any difference whether all
defendants are all agreeable to each other. Two or more co-tenants have
an equal right to request that their shares remain in co-tenancy for
the future. Under prior practice undivided interests could be retained
only where all defendants joined in the request. However, now this
privilege is given to two or more defendants, who own a majority
48

interest.

The court noted that this decision may lead to a subsequent partition action,
but even then the fourth defendant would have an opportunity to continue
his ownership'through a bid to purchase if that becomes necessary.
ZONING

Validity of Zoning Amendment
The appellant in Key Realty Co. Zoning Case49 purchased two lots and
converted a family residence on one of the lots into a three-unit apartment
house, a permitted use under the local zoning ordinance. Another apartment
house was to be built on the second lot, but because the side yard requirements
of the zoning 6rdinance were not met the appellant was refused a permit for
this proposed structure. After the zoning ordinance was amended to allow
only the erection of single-family dwellings, the appellant again attempted
to obtain a permit to build the second apartment house, but because apartment houses were then prohibited the permit was refused.
Appellant argued that the amendment did not apply to this lot, and that
his first request to build an apartment house established a prior existing nonconforming use. The supreme court dismissed this point, stating that
"appellant acquired no vested right in the continuation of the zoning classification which permitted the erection of an apartment building."' 0 Secondly,
the appellant contended that the amendatory ordinance was invalid because it
was not adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan. In ruling that
the amendment was valid, the court, in the following language, distinguished
the case from Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment : '
Parties defendant owning a majority in value of the property may object in
writing to any sale, requesting that the property be awarded to them at its
valuation fixed by the court and that their interests in the same remain undivided. Upon such request the entire property shall be awarded to the parties
objecting to sale, as tenants in common, subject to the payment to the parties
desiring partition and sale of the amounts of their respective interests based
upon valuation. The amounts due the parties shall be charged as liens upon the
property, to be paid in such manner and time as the court shall direct.
48. 405 Pa. at 292, 174 A.2d at 849.
49. 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962).
50. Id. at 99, 182 A.2d at 188.
51. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
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In Eves, zoning regulation assumed the form of ad hoc rezoning
of individual parcels; hence, we determined that it was not in accordance with a comprehensive plan. Here . . . the impact of the
amendatory zoning ordinance . . . falls equally upon all the prop-

erties within a wide area of the community.
More important, the ordinance constituted an integral part of
a general land program for the municipality .... 52
Special Exceptions
In Gilden Appeal,53 the township board of adjustment denied the issuance
of a special exception to a school for emotionally disturbed children, that
wished to relocate within the township. The board based its decision on that
part of the zoning ordinance which disallowed special exceptions to hospitals,
sanitariums, and penal institutions. In deciding that the school was an educational institution, and therefore entitled to a special exception within the
ordinance, the supreme court said:
In the absence of any definition to the contrary in the zoning
ordinance, the term "educational institution" as used in the ordinance
must be presumed to have been employed in its broadest sense,
while the word "sanitarium", being a prohibited use must be strictly
construed, since restrictions on a property owner's right to free use
of his property must be strictly construed and all doubts resolved
54
in his favor.
An ambulance club, which was a non-profit organization, was refused
a special exception by the local board of adjustment under an ordinance
allowing exceptions for philanthropic uses. The supreme court, in Good
Fellowship Ambulance Club's Appeal,55 overruled the board's decision, stating
that even though the organization's presence might increase noise and traffic
in the neighborhood, nevertheless it provided benefits to the community and
was largely a philanthropic institution entitled to the special exception.
52. 408 Pa. at 102-03, 182 A.2d at 189. Three of the six justices sitting concurred
in the result, but stated that the present tests utilized in deciding whether or not a
zoning ordinance is valid are not sufficient to protect individual constitutional property
rights. The concurring justices felt that the section of the Borough Code which requires
zoning regulations to be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 3303 (1957), is so vague and confusing as to be unconstitutional. They disapproved the majority opinion, and the opinions in Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958), and Best v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958), to the extent that these decisions
held that protection of general welfare alone is sufficient to enact a valid zoning ordinance. They said: "If general welfare were unlimited, virtually every right of liberty,
every right of property . . . as well as all the other fundamental rights which are . . .
guaranteed by the Constitution could be superseded.
... 408 Pa. at 116-17, 182 A.2d
at 197.
53. 406 Pa. 484, 178 A.2d 562 (1962).
54. Id. at 492, 178 A.2d at 566.
55. 406 Pa. 465, 178 A.2d 578 (1962).

1963]

JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHTS

ProceduralAspects
Rogalski v. Upper Chichester Township"6 presented the question whether
a court of common pleas may consider an appeal from the decision of a local
zoning board as a matter de novo, and therefore hear additional testimony.
The appellee had requested the grant of a special exception allowing him
to erect a cinder-block building on his property, and use it as an automobile
junk yard. The board refused the application, but the lower court reversed
the board's decision after conducting a hearing de novo. The supreme court
decided that in light of the applicable statute5 7 the lower court "may take
testimony if it deems it necessary for a proper disposition of the appeal ....
[and] then its duty is to decide the issue on the merits."58 This being the
case, the court said that appellate review is limited to deciding whether or
not the lower court abused its discretion, or committed an error of law.
Finding no such error or abuse, the court affirmed.
In Wynnewood Civic Ass'n v. Lower Merion Township Bd. of Adjustment,5 9 the association was attacking a change in the local zoning ordinance
which allowed erection of apartment houses in an area previously restricted
to single-family dwellings. After the board issued a building permit to
construct an apartment house in the area, the association, which had lost
earlier attacks upon the ordinance, appealed the issuance of the permit
to the board, questioning the validity of the ordinance on substantive
grounds.60 The board denied the appeal as did the court of common pleas.
Before the supreme court, the association argued only that the ordinance
was invalid because it was vague and indefinite, in that it failed to describe
the area to be rezoned. This point was also raised before the lower court,
which refused to pass on it. The supreme court decided that because the
56. 406 Pa. 550, 178 A.2d 712 (1962).
57.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

§ 58107

(1957)

If, upon hearing of the appeal, it shall appear to the court [common pleas]
that testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the appeal, it may take
evidence or appoint a referee to take evidence as it may direct and report the
same to the court with his findings of facts and conclusions of law. The court
may reverse or affirm, in whole or in part, the decision appealed from as to
it may appear just and proper.
58. 406 Pa. at 554, 178 A.2d at 714. This statute and its interpretation by the court
raise the question whether the purposes of the zoning board, that is, the application of its
expertise and first-hand knowledge to the testimony and questions before it, are not
being obviated. The Rogalski decision has ample support. Volpe Appeal, 384 Pa. 374,
121 A.2d 97 (1956) Dooling's Windy Hill v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 371 Pa. 290,
89 A.2d 505 (1953) but see Gage Zoning Case, 402 Pa. 244, 167 A.2d 292 (1961). See
Wynnewood Civic Ass'n v. Lower Merion Township Bd. of Adjustment, infra note 59,
which said that when the common pleas court takes no additional testimony, its review
is limited to whether the zoning board abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
59. 406 Pa. 413, 179 A.2d 649 (1962).
60. The association claimed that the commissioners were misled in passing the
ordinance and that the ordinance did not promote the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare, and was not in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
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lower court did not take any additional testimony, review by the lower court
was limited in that it could not consider a question not presented to the
board. The supreme court also could not consider this question because it
had not been properly raised below.
The appellants in Salisbury Township v. Sun Oil Co.61 applied to the
township zoning commissioners for a building permit to allow the construction
of a gas station in an area temporarily zoned residential.6 2 The application
was refused, but instead of appealing the decision the appellant ignored it and
commenced construction of the gas station. The township obtained a decree
enjoining this activity, from which the appellant appealed claiming that the
ordinance was invalid as an interim or "stop-gap" provision, citing Kline v.
Harrisburg.63 However, by the time the appeal was presented to the supreme
court, the final zoning ordinance, clearly prohibiting service stations in the
area, had been enacted. The supreme court dismissed the appeal because the
04
issue presented was moot.

EMINENT DOMAIN

In Hinanan v. Vandergrift,6 5 the plaintiffs sought to have a township
ordinance assessing them for the reconstruction of sidewalks abutting their
property declared invalid in its application to them. The need for reconstructing the sidewalks arose when the Commonwealth destroyed the previously existing ones in order to widen a state highway. The previously
existing sidewalks had been constructed within the right of way of the state
highway, and the cost of the materials used in their construction had been
paid by the plaintiffs. The township supervisor consented to the construction
and considered the sidewalks to be a part of the township municipal sidewalk
system. The superior court recognized that "the Commonwealth had the
undisputed right to destroy these sidewalks without paying damages," 66 and
cited the applicable statute 67 which allows no damages for the destruction
of improvements made within the right of way of a state highway. How61. 406 Pa. 604, 179 A.2d 195 (1962).

62. The township had enacted an interim ordinance, to be effective until a final
zoning plan and ordinance could be adopted.
63. 363 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949).
64. After dismissing the appeal, the court added:
Notwithstanding the mootness of the appeal . . . the proper procedure on the
part of appellants would have been to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to
the .. . [common pleas court] appealing the refusal of the commissioners to
grant a permit . . . the validity of zoning ordinances must be determined in
accordance with prescribed statutory procedure.
406 Pa. at 606, 179 A.2d at 197.
65. 197 Pa. Super. 140, 177 A.2d 174 (1962).
66. Id. at 143, 177 A.2d at 176.
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-208 (1961).

1963]

JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHTS

ever, the court ruled that the ordinance was inapplicable to the plaintiffs
because:
When a work of local public utility, such as a highway, a water
main or a sewer has once been constructed, either by the public
or at the expense of abutting owners, the latter cannot be charged
with the cost of any subsequent reconstruction or change, even
if this is a further benefit. 68
69
The city in Simon v. Philadelphia
condemned a right of way across
the appellant's land in order to construct an interceptor sewer. The appellant
claimed the value of the land taken but the city contended that his compensation should be lessened by the value of the benefits he received from this
municipal improvement. The supreme court affirmed on the opinion of the
lower court, which held that the installation of this sewer increased the
value of appellant's land in a peculiar manner, and this peculiar benefit could
be considered "just compensation" as demanded by the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 70 The court pointed out that the benefit had to be special to
appellant's land, and not general to the entire neighboring land. They felt that
since

plaintiff's land could be developed quickly . . . because it directly

abutted the intercepting sewer and its trunk and branch lines would
neither have to traverse anyone else's land nor carry with them the
increased cost of construction and time . . . . the jury could find
special benefits to plaintiff's abutting property ....71

The lower court in Rothman v. Commonwealth72 allowed the appellee
to introduce into evidence a proposed plan of subdivision of his property.
The state had condemned a portion of appellee's property to widen a state
highway. The effect of this condemnation was that the appellees "would have
on their hands two useless triangles of earth so isolated and so shaped that
they could not be utilized either for building or farming purposes." 73 On
appeal to the supreme court the Commonwealth demanded a new trial,
claiming that the admission of the plan allowed the jury to base their award
on a false standard, that is, the amount the property owners lost because of
the non-fulfillment of their plans, instead of the present value of the land.
The court, noting that the plan was drawn up two years before the condemnation, stated:
68. 197 Pa. Super. at 144, 177 A.2d at 177, quoting Vendetti Appeal, 181 Pa.
Super. 214, 124 A.2d 448 (1956).
69. 406 Pa. 281, 177 A.2d 621 (1962).
70. PA. CoNsT. art. 16, § 8. See Note, 66 DICK. L. REv. 453, 457-58 (1962), for
a discussion of the effect of benefits conferred as compensation in eminent domain.
71. Simon v. Philadelphia, 23 Pa. D. & C.2d 769, 774 (C.P. 1961).
72. 406 Pa. 376, 178 A.2d 605 (1962).
73. Id. at 377, 178 A.2d at 605.
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[T]he plan did not . . . allow the jury to cumulate damages on

supposed values of individual lots. The purpose of the plan was
merely to show the use to which the land was best adapted. No
evidence was introduced either as to the value of individual lots or
74
as to other lots in the area.
In reaching its decision the court distinguished Earl M. Kerstetter, Inc.
v. Commonwealth,75 which held that the lower court erred when it admitted
evidence of the plaintiff's subdivision plans, thereby allowing the jury to
consider the difference in the number of lots before and after the condemnation. The court in Rothman pointed out that in Kerstetter the lower court
had admitted the plan as a means for allowing the plaintiff to show the value
of the individual lots; this was not done in Rothman. Apparently, the
controlling fact in Rothman was that the court was convinced the jury had
been properly instructed and only considered the value of the property before
and after the taking. Two justices dissented.
Anderson Appeal76 involved the question whether the Delaware River
Port Authority is an agency of the Commonwealth, entitling it to claim the
Commonwealth's immunity from liability for consequential damages77 arising
from its activities. The plaintiff brought suit against the authority claiming
that the authority by its construction of the Walt Whitman Bridge had de-prived her of light, air and view. She argued that the authority is a municipal
or public corporation required by the Pennsylvania Constitution to make
compensation for any injury to her property.7 8 The supreme court, noting
that there had been only consequential damage to plaintiff's land, stated:
A study of the enabling and governing statutes reveals that Authority
is not a mere public corporation, but, rather, was intended to be
and has always been an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania carrying out an executive function
and hence immune from the
79
payment of consequential dimages.
In so ruling the court disapproved of the statement made in Souder v.
Philadelphia Police Pension Fund8" that the Delaware River Joint Com74. Id. at 379, 178 A.2d at 606.
75. 404 Pa. 168, 172 A.2d 163 (1961), discussed in Dodd, Pennsylvania Property
Cases of 1961, 66 DICK. L. REV. 167, 175 (1962).
76. 408 Pa. 179, 182 A.2d 514 (1962).
77. On this immunity, the court said: "Ithas long been the established rule that
absent an act of the legislature expressly imposing liability, the Commonwealth is not
liable for consequential damages to land where there is no actual physical taking."
Id. at 181, 182 A.2d at 515.
78. PA. CONST. art. 16, § 8.
79. 408 Pa. at 182, 182 A.2d at 515. The court relied heavily on the portion of
the enabling act which states that the authority "shall constitute the public corporate
instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . which shall be deemed to
be exercising an essential governmental function ......
Id. at 184, 182 A.2d at 516,
quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3503 (1961).
80. 344 Pa. 286, 25 A.2d 191 (1942).
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mission, successor to the authority, is a public body separate from the
Commonwealth.
Whether a landowner may obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent
a municipality from condemning only an air flight easement over his land
was the question presented to the supreme court in Schwab v. Pottstown
Borough.8 ' The plaintiff's land was adjacent to the airport and "in the path
of the clear zone approach area of the runway." He claimed that the
municipality had to take a fee simple interest in the land instead of merely
an air flight easement. The court denied the injunction because the plaintiff
had not proceeded properly. It held that the plaintiff may not use an injunction to increase compensation due him from a condemnation of his
property, because eminent domain proceedings are his exclusive remedy.
The court said that "no injuries . . . will result to plaintiff-appellant for which

he cannot be compensated by resort to orderly procedure before a board of
view."'8 2 Support for this ruling was found in the proposition that "where
the legislature has provided a remedy or procedure, that remedy or procedure
is exclusive and alone must be pursued."8 "
MISCELLANEOUS

s4

In Secary Estate; the supreme court had to decide whether the
decedent's brother was entitled to the contents of a safe deposit box which
both the decedent and his brother had leased. The box was leased under the
following provision:
In case the Lessees are joint tenants, . . . all property . . . placed

in said box is the joint property of both Lessees and upon the
death of either, passes to the survivor. .

.

. Each of the Lessees

shall have full access to and the control of the contents of said box
without further authority. 5
The brother claimed that this lease created a gift of a joint interest with
the right of survivorship in the contents of the box, and that this gift was
substantiated by oral testimony. This claim was based on King Estate,8 6 which
involved a lease identical with the one in this case, where it was held that
a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship had been created. The supreme
court in Secary quoted extensively from the King case, agreeing that a

valid gift of a joint tenancy requires an intention to make an immediate gift,
and "such an actual or constructive delivery . . . to invest in the donee
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

407 Pa. 531, 180 A.2d 921 (1962).
Id. at 534, 180 A.2d at 923.
Ibid., citing Jacobs v. Fetzer, 381 Pa. 262, 112 A.2d 356 (1955).
407 Pa. 162, 180 A.2d 572 (1962).
Id. at 165, 180 A.2d at 573.
387 Pa. 119, 126 A.2d 463 (1956).
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so much dominion and control of the subject matter of the gift as is consonant
with a joint ownership .
*...
"87 The King case also held that this lease,
which was involved in both cases, will raise a presumption of joint ownership
of the box's contents. But the holding in the King case was based on the
oral evidence presented in favor of a joint tenancy; thus the Secary court
distinguished the two cases. In holding that the decedent's estate had sustained its burden in showing a failure of delivery of the box, the court
pointed out that the brother had no key to the box, and while the decedent
had entered the box thirty-three times, the only two times the brother
entered were after the decedent's death and while accompanied by decedent's
widow.
In Balkiewicz v. Asenavage,88 a widow brought ejectment to recover
possession of an undivided one-third interest in real estate her husband had
conveyed during coverture without her joinder. The supreme court dismissed
the action, holding that her proper remedy was to bring a partition action,
after which she could maintain a possessory action relating to the land
awarded her. The court quoted Pringle v. Gaw,89 where it was said:
By the common law, it is well established that if the widow's claim
be in the nature of dower, an ejectment will not lie before an assignment. She is not seised of an undivided third part with the heirs.
Hutton, 18 Hob. 181. Ejectment is a possessory action; and it is
certain she cannot hold possession against the heir. She is not seised
until assignment, of an undivided third part. The widow and heir,
or heirs, are neither tenants in common, joint-tenants, nor co90
parceners.
Although the Intestate Act of 194791 has given a widow a greater quantity
of property conveyed without her joinder than she was entitled to under.
common law, the modern statutory scheme of distribution has not changed
the nature of her ownership.
87. 407 Pa. at 166, 180 A.2d at 574.
88. 406 Pa. 501, 178 A.2d 591 (1962).
89. 5 S. & R. 536 (Pa. 1820).
90. 406 Pa. at 503, 178 A.2d at 592.
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.5(a) (1950), provides, inter alia, that the widow's
"share in real estate aliened by the husband in his lifetime, without her joining in the
conveyance, shall be the same as her share in real estate of which the husband dies
seised."

